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Abstract
We study how storage, operating as a price maker within a market environment,
may be optimally operated over an extended period of time. The optimality criterion
may be the maximisation of the profit of the storage itself, where this profit results
from the exploitation of the differences in market clearing prices at different times.
Alternatively it may be the minimisation of the cost of generation, or the maximisation
of consumer surplus or social welfare. In all cases there is calculated for each successive
time-step the cost function measuring the total impact of whatever action is taken by
the storage. The succession of such cost functions provides the information for the
storage to determine how to behave over time, forming the basis of the appropriate
optimisation problem. Further, optimal decision making, even over a very long or
indefinite time period, usually depends on a knowledge of costs over a relatively short
running time horizon—for storage of electrical energy typically of the order of a day
or so.
We study particularly competition between multiple stores, where the objective of
each store is to maximise its own income given the activities of the remainder. We
show that, at the Cournot Nash equilibrium, multiple large stores collectively erode
their own abilities to make profits: essentially each store attempts to increase its own
profit over time by overcompeting at the expense of the remainder. We quantify this
for linear price functions
We give examples throughout based on Great Britain spot-price market data.
1 Introduction
There has been much discussion in recent years on the role of storage in future energy
networks. It can be used to buffer the highly variable output of renewable generation such
as wind and solar power, and it further has the potential to smooth fluctuations in de-
mand, thereby reducing the need for expensive and carbon-emitting peaking plants. For a
discussion of the use of storage in providing multiple buffering and smoothing capabilities,
including the ability to integrate renewable generation into energy networks see, for exam-
ple, the fairly recent review by Denholm et al (2010) [7], and the many references therein.
Within an economic framework much of the value of energy storage may be realised by al-
lowing it to operate in a market environment, provided that the latter is structured in such
a way as to allow this to happen. Thus the smoothing of variations in demand between,
for example, nighttime when demand is low and daytime when demand in high may be
achieved by allowing a store to buy energy at night when the low demand typically means
∗Heriot-Watt University. Research supported by EPSRC grant EP/I017054/1
†University of Warwick
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
6.
05
36
1v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
6 J
un
 20
16
that it is relatively cheap, and to sell it again in the day when it is expensive. Similarly,
the use of storage for buffering against shortfalls in renewable generation may—at least in
part—be effected by allowing storage to operate in a responsive spot-price market when
prices will rise at the times of such shortfall. We remark though that if it is intended that
the use of storage should facilitate, for example, a reduction in carbon emissions, then
there is of course no guarantee that a market environment will in itself permit this to hap-
pen; it may be necessary that the market itself, and the rules under which it operates, are
correctly structured so as to penalise or prohibit environmentally damaging generation or
to reward clean energy production—for some recent insights into the possible unexpected
side effects of storage operating in a market, see Virasjoki et al [21].
A small store may be expected to function as a price-taker, buying and selling so as,
for example, to maximise its own profit over time. However, a larger store will act as a
price-maker, perhaps significantly affecting the market in which it operates, and thus also
affecting quantities such as generator costs, consumer surplus and social welfare. Further
a number of larger stores, by competing with each other, may smooth prices to the point
where they are unable to make sufficient profits as to be economically viable.
Aspects of many of these issues have been explored in the literature. Recent work on the
use of storage in a specifically market environment is given by Gast et al [9, 10], Graves
et al [11], Hu et al [14] and Secomandi [18]. Sioshansi et at [20] study the effects of
storage on producer and consumer surplus and on social welfare. Sioshansi [19] gives
an example where storage may may reduce social welfare. Gast et el [9] show how in
appropriate circumstances storage may be used to minimise generation costs and thus
maximise consumer welfare.
In the present paper we aim to develop a more comprehensive mathematical theory of the
way in which storage interacts with the market in which it operates. Our fundamental
assumption is that each individual store operates over an extended period of time in such
a way as to optimise its “profit”—or equivalently minimise its costs—with respect to
time-varying cost functions presented to it. These may represent either the prevailing
costs within a free market, as may be natural when the store is independently owned, or
adjusted costs which take into account the wider impact of the stores activities, as would
be appropriate when the store was owned, for example, by the generators or by society—
see Section 5. Thus if it is desirable that a store should function in a particular way—for
example, to minimise generation costs—it may be fed the appropriate cost signals and,
given those signals, left to perform as an autonomous agent. Such an approach is notably
desirable in facilitating distributed control and optimisation within a possibly complex
environment. In this paper are particularly interested in studying the economic effects of
competition between multiple stores, not least on the viability of the stores themselves.
The typically high capital costs of storage, in relation to operating costs, mean that
competition between stores may reduce price differentials across time to the extent that
stores are unable to make sufficient operating profit as to permit the recovery of their
capital costs.
Within our analysis we therefore treat storage as generating its revenue by arbitrage within
a market in which prices are low at times of energy surplus and high at times of scarcity.
While, within an appropriately structured and responsive market, this may allow storage
to operate so as to realise many of its economic benefits, we acknowledge that there
are many other uses of storage whose benefits may not be so easily captured. Notably
this is the case where storage needs to react on a very short time scale, for example to
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compensate for sudden shortfalls of generation, or to provide stability within a system,
and where there is insufficient time for the value of such actions to be captured within
a spot market environment. For some work on the simultaneous use of storage for both
arbitrage and buffering against the effects of sudden events see Cruise and Zachary [6],
while for work on a whole systems assessment of the value of energy storage see Pudjianto
et al [17].
We outline in Section 2 the model for the market in which storage operates. In particular
this allows for supply and demand which are sensitive to price, and hence also for an
impact on price of the market activities of the storage itself (so that the storage may be
considered as a price maker). We assume for the moment (but see also below) that a
single store wishes to optimise its own profit, or minimise its own costs, by trading in the
market, we formulate the corresponding optimisation problem faced by the store and we
state how it may be solved. Formally the environment is deterministic, but we discuss
also the extent to which it is possible to proceed similarly in a stochastic environment.
In Section 3 we study the effect of a single profit-maximising store in a market. We look
at its effect on both market prices and on consumer surplus and give sensitivity results
for the variation of the size of the store. We give examples based on Great Britain market
data.
In Section 4 we study a number of competing stores operating in a market. We consider
possible models of competition, whereby the stores make bids and clearing prices in the
market are determined. We identify Nash equilibria for the model of competition in
which stores bid quantities—a generalisation of Cournot competition—give existence and
uniqueness results, and show how equilibria may be determined. We further show that,
even for this arguably most favourable model of competition (from the point of view of the
stores) an oversupply of storage capacity leads to a situation in which, with linear price
functions, the total profit made by all the stores is approximately inversely proportional
to their number. Essentially what happens here is that, relative to a cooperative solution,
each store over-trades in order to acquire a larger share of total profit, thereby impacting
on the market in such a way as to reduce price differentials over time and thus also the
profits to be made by other stores. Thus a sufficiently large number of stores are unable
to make profits, and so—presumably—recoup their capital costs. In this section we also
give examples again based on GB market data and relating to such competition between
stores.
Finally, in Section 5 we consider variant problems in which storage (instead of consisting of
independent profit-maximising entities) is managed, for example, for the optimal benefit of
consumers, or for the optimal benefit of generators. We show that, by suitable redefinition
of cost functions, these variant problems may be reduced mathematically to those already
studied.
2 Model
We now formulate our model for a set of n ≥ 1 stores operating in an energy market.
Formally we treat prices and costs as deterministic. However, in a stochastic environment
it may be reasonable, at each successive point in time, to replace future prices and costs
by their expected values and to then proceed as in the deterministic case. That this can,
in many cases, lead to optimal or near optimal behaviour for a single store is shown in
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Cruise et al [5]. It is further the case that, for many applications—notably electricity
storage—optimal decision making over long or even indefinite time horizons nevertheless
only requires a real-time knowledge of future costs over a short running time horizon,
something which is again shown formally in [5]. Thus electricity storage may make its
profits by exploiting differences between daytime and nighttime prices and if these are
sufficiently different that the storage typically fills and empties on a daily—or almost
daily basis—then ongoing optimal management may never require a knowledge of future
prices for more than a few days ahead.
We assume that each store j has an energy capacity Ej and input and output rate con-
straints PIj and POj respectively (the maximum amount of energy which can enter or
leave the store per unit time). Each such store j also has an efficiency j ∈ (0, 1], where
j is the number of units of energy output which the store can achieve for each unit of
energy input. We assume without loss of generality that any loss of energy due to inef-
ficiency occurs immediately after leaving the store (so that the above capacity and rate
constraints—both input and output—apply to volume of energy input). For simplicity we
also assume that there is no time-dependent leakage of energy from the stores; the simple
adjustments required to deal with any such leakage are analogous to those described in [5].
We work in discrete time t = 1, . . . , T for some finite time horizon T . Associated with each
such time t is a price function pt such that pt(x) is the market price per unit of energy
when x is the total amount (positive or negative) of energy bought from the market by
all the stores, i.e. xpt(x) is the total cost to the stores of buying this energy. (Each of
the functions pt is of course influenced by everything else that is happening in the market
at time t; it explicitly measures only the further effect on price of the activity of the
stores.) We assume throughout that, over the range of possible values of its argument (i.e.
the interval [−∑nj=1 jPOj ,∑nj=1 PIj ]), each of the functions pt is positive and increasing
and is such that, for any constant k, the function of x given by xpt(x + k) is convex
and increasing. (The quantity xpt(x + k) is the total cost to a store of buying x units
of energy—again positive or negative—at time t when the total amount bought by the
remaining stores at that time is k.) An important case in which these conditions are
satisfied, and which we consider in detail later, is that where the prices are linearised so
that
pt(x) = p¯t + p
′
tx (1)
where p¯t > 0 and where p
′
t ≥ 0 is such that the function pt remains positive for all possible
values of its argument as above. This should, for example, be a good approximation
whenever the total storage capacity is not too large in relation to the total size of the
market in which the stores operate. In such a case, we may take p¯t = pt(0) (i.e. the
price at time t without storage on the system) and p′t = p′t(0). More generally, the
above conditions on the functions pt seem likely to be satisfied in many cases, for example
when they do not differ too much from the above linear case, and are in all cases readily
checkable.
In particular if st(p) is the amount externally supplied to the market at time t and price p
and dt(p) is the corresponding total demand at that time and price—and if the functions st
and dt are given independently of the activities of any stores—then we may define the
residual supply function Rt at that time by Rt(p) = st(p)− dt(p); if Rt is continuous and
strictly increasing then we have that pt is the inverse of the function Rt and is similarly
continuous and strictly increasing. If, furthermore, each of the functions Rt is differentiable
and prices take the form (1), with p¯t = pt(0) and p
′
t = p
′
t(0), then we may relate p
′
t to the
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point elasticities of supply and demand at price p¯t, denoted es and ed respectively, in the
following way:
p′t =
p¯t
esst(p¯t)− eddt(p¯t) . (2)
This method of determining the price functions pt is especially relevant when the other
players in the market make their decisions without taking the stores’ actions into account,
perhaps due to the relatively small level of storage capacity in relation to the rest of the
market. With sufficient information, more complex price functions pt could be derived,
for example by considering games between the stores and the rest of the energy system.
We denote the successive levels of each store j by a vector Sj = (Sj0, . . . , SjT ) where each
Sjt is the energy level of the store at time t. It is convenient to assume that the initial
and final levels of the store are constrained to fixed values S∗j0 and S
∗
jT respectively. For
each such vector Sj and for each t = 1, . . . , T , define also xt(Sj) = Sjt − Sj,t−1 to be the
amount (positive or negative) by which the level of the store is increased at time t.
In order to incorporate efficiency, it is helpful to define, for each store j, the function hj on
R by hj(x) = x for x ≥ 0 and hj(x) = jx for x < 0. For each time t such that xt(Sj) ≥ 0,
store j buys xt(Sj) units of energy from the market, while for t such that xt(Sj) < 0, it
sells −jxt(Sj) units of energy to the market. For each store j and time t, and given the
changes xit, j 6= i, (positive or negative) in the levels of the remaining stores at that time,
define now the cost function Cjt( · ; xit, j 6= i) by
Cjt(xjt; xit, j 6= i) = hj(xjt)pt
( n∑
i=1
hi(xit)
)
; (3)
this represents the cost to store j of increasing its level by xjt (again positive or negative)
at time t, given the corresponding activities of the remaining stores at that time. Note that
the conditions on the function pt ensure that Cjt(xjt; xit, j 6= i) is an increasing convex
function of its principal argument xjt and takes the value zero when this argument is zero.
In particular if the objective of store j is to optimise its profit, given the policy over time
Si = (Si0, . . . , SiT ) of every other store i 6= j, then it faces the following optimisation
problem:
Pj : Choose Sj = (Sj0, . . . , SjT ) so as to minimise the function of Sj given by
T∑
t=1
Cjt(xt(Sj); xt(Si), j 6= i) (4)
subject to the capacity constraints
Sj0 = S
∗
j0, SjT = S
∗
jT , 0 ≤ Sjt ≤ Ej , 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. (5)
and the rate constraints
xt(Sj) ∈ Xj , 1 ≤ t ≤ T, (6)
where Xj = {x : −POj ≤ x ≤ PIj}.
Note that the observed convexity of the cost functions Cjt( · ; xit, j 6= i) ensures that a
solution to the optimisation problem Pj always exists.
At various points we make use of the following result, taken from [5], and in which each
of the vectors µ∗j is essentially a vector of (cumulative) Lagrange multipliers.
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Proposition 1. For any store j = 1, . . . , n, and for any fixed policies Si of every other
store i 6= j, suppose that there exists a vector µ∗j = (µ∗j1, . . . , µ∗jT ) and a value S∗j =
(S∗j0, . . . , S
∗
jT ) of Sj such that
(i) S∗j is feasible for the stated problem Pj;
(ii) for each t with 1 ≤ t ≤ T , xt(S∗j ) minimises
Cjt(xjt; xt(Si), j 6= i)− µ∗jtxjt
in xjt ∈ Xj; and
(iii) the pair (S∗j , µ
∗
j ) satisfies the complementary slackness conditions, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T −1,
µ∗j,t+1 = µ
∗
jt if 0 < S
∗
jt < Ej,
µ∗j,t+1 ≤ µ∗jt if S∗jt = 0,
µ∗j,t+1 ≥ µ∗jt if S∗jt = Ej.
(7)
Then S∗j solves the above optimisation problem Pj. Further, the given convexity of the
cost functions Cjt( · ; xt(Si), j 6= i) guarantees the existence of such a pair (S∗j , µ∗j ).
In the case of a single store, [5] provides an algorithm which determines a suitable pair
(S∗1 , µ∗1) satisfying the conditions (i)–(iii) above. A key advantage of the algorithm is
its exploitation of the result that the optimal decision of a store at any each successive
time t typically depends only on the price information associated with a relatively short
interval of time subsequent to t. The convexity of the cost functions is required only to
guarantee the existence of such a pair, but as long as such a pair exists, the algorithm
could be implemented (with some obvious adjustments) to determine the optimal policy
of the store under more general cost functions—see Flatley et al [8] for a discussion of
this. In Section 4 we adapt the algorithm in [5] to the case of n competing stores.
Remark 1. In cases where the stores are not independent profit maximising entities but are
instead owned by, for example, the generators or by society, the above cost functions Cjt
may be appropriately modified so that the problems Pj continue to define optimal be-
haviour for the stores; see Section 5 for a discussion of how this may be done.
3 The single store in a market
In the case n = 1 of a single store it is convenient to drop the subscript j and to write S
for Sj , etc. The single-store optimisation problem is then to choose S = (S0, . . . , ST ) so
as to minimise
T∑
t=1
Ct(xt(S))
(where the Ct are the cost functions defined by (3)) subject to the capacity constraints
(5) and rate constraints (6).
For simplicity we assume the strict convexity of the cost functions Ct—as, for example,
will be the case when the linear approximation (1) holds with p′t > 0 for each t. This strict
convexity is sufficient to guarantee the uniqueness of the solution S∗ of the optimisation
problem P.
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3.1 Sensitivity of store activity to capacity and rate constraints
Let (S∗, µ∗) be the pair identified in Proposition 1, defining the solution S∗ of the above
optimisation problem P. Then the market clearing price at each time t is pt(h(xt(S
∗)).
The successive clearing prices then determine such quantities as consumer surplus—in the
way we describe later.
As a measure of the sensitivity of the market to variation of the size of the store, we use
Proposition 1 to describe briefly how variation of either the capacity or the rate constraints
of the store impacts on the solution S∗ of P. Proposition 1 continues to hold when we allow
either the capacity or the rate constraints of the store to depend on the time t. Therefore
it is sufficient to consider the effect of variation of these constraints at any single time t0.
Consider first the effect of an arbitrarily small increase (positive or negative) δEt0 in the
capacity of the store at time t0; since the initial and final levels S
∗
0 and S
∗
T are fixed we
assume 0 < t0 < T . It is clear from Proposition 1 that this infinitesimal change has
no effect on S∗ unless S∗t0 = E; further if δEt0 > 0 we also require the strict inequality
µ∗t0+1 > µ
∗
t0 . Under these conditions there exist times t1 < t0 < t2, such that the effect
of the increment δEt0—provided it is indeed sufficiently small—is to change µ
∗
t , and so
also xt(S
∗) (via the condition (ii) of Proposition 1), for t such that t1 < t ≤ t0, both
the original and the new values of µ∗t being constant over this interval, and to similarly
change µ∗t and xt(S∗) for t such that t0 < t ≤ t2, again both the original and the new
values of µ∗t being constant over this interval; all changes within the second of the above
intervals have the opposite sign to those within the first; for all remaining values of t, the
parameter µ∗t remains unchanged. The change in µ∗t over each of the above intervals is
readily determined by the requirement that now S∗t0 = E + δEt0 . (Thus, for example,
for a perfectly efficient store and twice differentiable cost functions Ct, the effect of an
increment δEt0 > 0—where t0 is such that µ
∗
t0+1
> µ∗t0—will be to increase xt(S
∗) in
proportion to 1/C ′′t (xt(S∗)) for times t such that t1 < t ≤ t0 and at which the input rate
constraint is nonbinding, and to similarly decrease xt(S
∗) in proportion to 1/C ′′t (xt(S∗))
for times t such that t0 < t ≤ t2 and at which the output rate constraint is nonbinding.)
Similarly an arbitrarily small change at time t0 in either the input or the output rate
constraint has no effect on (S∗, µ∗) unless µ∗t0 and xt0(S
∗) are such that that constraint is
binding in the solution of the minimisation problem of (ii) of Proposition 1. The effect is
then again to change µ∗t and xt(S∗) for those t in an interval which includes t0; both this
interval and the required changes are again readily identifiable from that proposition.
3.2 Impact of a store on prices and consumer surplus
Impact on prices. In general we may expect the impact of the store on the market to be
that of smoothing prices over time: the store will in general buy at times when prices are
low, thereby competing in the market and increasing prices at those times, and similarly
sell at times when prices are high, thereby decreasing them at those times. Relaxing the
power rates or capacity constraints of the store may then be expected to result in further
smoothing of the prices, as the store is able to buy and sell more at times of low and
high prices, thereby augmenting the above effect. We might also expect that increasing
the efficiency of the store will further smooth prices, but this is not so clear-cut, as we
illustrate in the following example.
Example 1. Consider price functions of the linear form (1) and a store which operates over
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just two time steps (T = 2), starting and finishing empty but not otherwise subject to
capacity or rate constraints. Suppose further that p2 = ap1 > 0 for some a > 1. Then, for
efficiency , the store buys x() units of energy at time 1 and sells x() units at time 2,
where
x() =
0 if a < 1p2 − p1
2(p′1 + 2p′2)
otherwise.
(8)
In the presence of the store the difference between the market clearing price at time t2 and
that at time t1 is given by p2(x()) − p1(x()), and it is easy to check that for suitable
values of the parameters p¯t, p
′
t, t = 1, 2, this expression is an increasing function of  for 
sufficiently close to 1—contrary to the expectation mentioned above.
Impact on consumer surplus. The consumer surplus associated with a demand func-
tion d and clearing price p0 is usually defined as
∫∞
p0
d(p) dp, and so the consumer surplus
of the store’s optimal strategy S∗ is given by
T∑
t=1
∫ ∞
pt(h(xt(S∗)))
dt(p) dp, (9)
where dt(p) is the consumer demand associated with price p at time t. If the size or
activity level of the store is such that the price changes caused by its introduction are
relatively small, and we additionally make the linear approximation (1), then the change
in consumer surplus due to the introduction of the store is well approximated by
−
T∑
t=1
h(xt(S
∗))p′tdt(p¯t). (10)
It might reasonably be expected that, if the store is reasonably efficient ( is close to one)
and if prices are well-correlated with demand, then the store will buy (xt > 0) at times of
low consumer demand and sell (xt < 0) at times of high consumer demand, and that this
will have a beneficial effect on consumer surplus—as suggested by (10) whenever the price
sensitivities p′t are sufficiently similar to each other. However, these price sensitivities p′t
do need to be taken into account. Again we give an example.
Example 2. Consider again a store with linear prices of the form (1), which starts and
finishes empty and which operates over just two time steps, i.e. T = 2. Assume that the
power ratings of the store exceed its capacity and that demand is completely inelastic, so
that, for t = 1, 2, there exists d∗t ≥ 0 such that dt(p) = d∗t for all prices p. Then, from
(10), as long as p1 < p2, the change in consumer surplus on introducing the store to the
electricity network is
min
(
p2 − p1
2(p′1 + 2p′2)
, E
)(
p′2d
∗
2 − p′1d∗1
)
,
which is clearly negative whenever p′2d∗2 < p′1d∗1. In the latter case the price sensitivity p′1
at time 1 is sufficiently high that the decrease in consumer surplus at this time as a result
the store buying outweighs the increase in consumer surplus at time 2 as a result of the
store selling. Sioshanshi [19] gives similar examples of cases where storage reduces social
welfare, defined as a sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and the store’s profit.
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Remark 2. In the case of linearised prices of the form (1)—so that the cost functions Ct
are quadratic with a discontinuity of slope at 0—we can deduce some further results. In
particular, both the market clearing price at each time t, given by pt+p
′
th(xt(S
∗)), and the
consumer surplus, given by the approximation (10), are then piecewise linear functions of
the capacity of the store. This follows from the observations of Section 3.1, in particular
from the condition (ii) of Proposition 1, which shows that the vector of optimised levels S∗
is a piecewise linear function of the vector µ∗. As the capacity E is varied at a single time
t0, the discussion of Section 3.1 therefore implies that µ
∗ must vary piecewise linearly with
respect to this variation, between the times t1 and t2 identified above.
3.3 Example
We consider an example based on half-hourly market electricity prices in Great Britain
throughout the year 2014. These are the so-called Market Index Prices as supplied by
Elexon [1], who are responsible for operating the Balancing and Settlement Code for
the Great Britain wholesale electricity market. These are considered to form a good
approximation to real-time spot prices.
These prices, given in units of pounds per megawatt-hour, exhibit an approximately cycli-
cal behaviour, being high by day and low by night and, apart from this, are reasonably
consistent throughout the year except for some mild seasonal variation, notably that prices
are slightly lower during the summer months.
We take the price functions pt to be given by
pt(x) = p¯t (1 + λx) , (11)
where the p¯t, t = 1, . . . T , are proportional to the spot market prices referred to above.
These price functions are a special case of the linear functions (1), in which the price
sensitivity p′t is proportional to p¯t, an assumption which is in many circumstances very
plausible; the constant of proportionality λ ≥ 0 may then be considered a market impact
factor. The relation (11) also implies that λ should be chosen in proportion to the physical
size of the unit of energy: for any k > 0, the substitution of x/k for x and kλ for λ
leaves (11) unchanged. We therefore find it convenient to consider a store whose nominal
dimensions are generally held constant, and to allow λ to vary: the market impact as λ is
increased is equivalent to that which occurs when λ is held constant and the dimensions
of the store are allowed to increase instead. The case λ = 0 corresponds to no market
impact (appropriate to a relatively small store). Clearly also there exists λmax such that,
for λ ≥ λmax both the rate and capacity constraints of the store cease to be binding, so
that for all λ ≥ λmax the market impact of the store is the same, and—again by the above
scaling argument—may be regarded as that of an unconstrained store.
We take a storage facility with common input and output rate constraints and, without
loss of generality, we choose units of energy such that, on the half-hourly timescale of the
spot-price data, this common rate constraint is equal to 1 unit per half-hour. For the
numerical example, we in general take the capacity of the store to be given by E = 10
units; this corresponds to the assumption that the store empties or fills in a total time
of 5 hours. This capacity to rate ratio is fairly typical, being in particular close to that
for the Dinorwig pumped storage facility in Snowdonia [2] (though the charge time and
discharge times for Dinorwig are approximately 7 hours and 5 hours respectively). We in
general take the round-trip efficiency as  = 0.75, which is again comparable to that of
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Dinorwig. Thus the effect on market prices given by varying λ, which we discuss below,
corresponds to that considering the effect on the market of rescaled versions of a facility
not too dissimilar from Dinorwig. We also investigate briefly the effect of varying the
capacity constraint E relative to the unit rate constraint, and the effect of varying the
round-trip efficiency .
Figure 1 shows, for E = 10 and  = 0.75, the effect of varying the market impact λ. The
control of the store is optimised, as previously discussed, over the entire one-year period for
which price data are available (with the store starting and finishing empty). For relatively
small values of λ the store fills and empties (or nearly so) on a daily cycle, as it takes
advantage of low nighttime and high daytime prices. For significantly larger values of the
market impact factor λ, the store no longer fills and empties on a daily basis (as this factor
now erodes the day-night price differential as the volume traded increases); however, the
level of the store may gradually vary on a much longer time scale as the store remains
able to take advantage of even modest seasonal price variations. The first six panels of
panels of Figure 1 show plots of the time-varying levels of the store against selected values
of λ. For λ = 0, λ = 0.1 and λ = 0.5 the level of the store is plotted against time for the
first two weeks of the year, while for λ = 1, λ = 5 and λ = 10 the level of the store is
plotted against time for the entire year. The final panel of Figure 1 shows a plot against
time—for the first two weeks of the year—of the market clearing price corresponding to
λ = 0, λ = 0.5, and λ = 10. The erosion of the day/night price differential as λ increases
is clearly seen.
For values of λ greater than λmax ≈ 23 the volumes traded are such that neither the rate
nor the capacity constraints of the store are binding, so that for λ > λmax volumes traded
are simply proportional to 1/λ.
The left panels of Figure 2 show the effect on store level—over the entire year—of decreas-
ing the efficiency of the store from  = 0.75 (for which the store level is shown in red) to
 = 0.65 (for which the store level is shown in blue), for each of the larger values of λ
considered above, i.e. for λ = 1, λ = 5 and λ = 10. The capacity of the store is here kept
at our base level of E = 10. Decreasing the efficiency of the store reduces its ability to
exploit the daily cycle of price variation in a manner not dissimilar from that of increasing
the market impact λ, so that again the volumes of daily trading are reduced, while the
store may continue to exploit its full capacity on a seasonal basis—again for a very modest
further gain. We remark also that reducing the efficiency of the store reduces the extent
to which it is able to smooth prices.
The right panels of Figure 2 similarly show the effect—again over the entire year and for
the same three values of λ—of increasing the capacity of the store from E = 10 (for which
the store level is shown in red) to E = 20 (for which the store level is shown in blue).
The round trip efficiency of the store is kept at  = 0.75. In each case it is seen that the
daily variation in the level of the store remains much the same as E is increased (since
for these levels of λ there is too much market impact to make profitable greater volumes
of daily trading, except on occasions in the case λ = 1). However, for λ = 1 and for
λ = 5, as E is increased the store is able to make some (very modest) additional profit by
varying slowly throughout the year the general level at which it operates. For λ = 10 the
market impact is so great that the capacity constraint E = 10—and so also the capacity
constraint E = 20—is never binding, so that in this case the increase in the capacity has
no effect.
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Figure 1: Single store: behaviour of store level and market clearing price (see text for a
discussion of units) as the market impact factor λ is varied—equivalently the size of the
store is varied.
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Figure 2: Single store: behaviour of the store level as the round-trip efficiency  is varied
from 0.75 to 0.65 (left panels) and as the capacity E is varied from 10 to 20 (right panels),
in each case for λ = 1, λ = 5 and λ = 10.
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4 Competing stores in a market
In this section we discuss n competing stores in a market, where it is assumed that the
objective of each store is to maximise its own profit. The optimal strategy of each store
in general depends on the activities of the remainder, and what happens depends on
the extent to which there is cooperation between the stores. In the absence of any such
cooperation we might reasonably expect some form of convergence over time to a Nash
equilibrium, in which each store’s strategy is optimal given those of the others. We first
discuss briefly the cooperative solution, primarily for the purpose of reference, before
considering the effect of market competition.
4.1 The cooperative solution
Here the stores behave cooperatively so as to minimise their combined cost
n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
hi(xt(Si))pt
( n∑
k=1
hk(xt(Sk))
)
, (12)
subject to the capacity constraints (5) and rate constraints (6). This is a generalisation to
higher dimensions of the single-store problem, and we do not discuss a detailed solution
here. Note, however, that an iterative approach to the determination of a solution may be
possible. Under our assumptions on the price functions, the function of S1, . . . , Sn given
by (12) is convex. For any store j, given the levels Si of the remaining stores i 6= j, the
minimisation of (12) in Sj (subject to the above constraints) is an instance of the single-
store problem discussed in Section 3—with cost functions modified so as reflect the overall
cost to all the stores of the actions of the store j. This leads to the obvious iterative
algorithm in which (12) is minimised in Sj for successive stores j until convergence is
achieved. However, the limiting value of (S1, . . . , Sn), while frequently a global minimum,
is not guaranteed to be so.
In the case where the stores have identical efficiencies one might also consider the sim-
plified single-store problem in which the individual capacity constraints are summed and
individual rate constraints are summed. If the solution to this, suitably divided between
the stores (i.e. with a fraction κi of the optimal flow assigned to each store i, where∑n
i=1 κi = 1), is feasible for the original problem then it solves that problem. One case
where this is true is where additionally the ratios Ej/PIj and Ej/POj are the same for
all stores j; the solution to the simplified single-store problem is then just divided among
the stores in proportion to their capacities to give the cooperative solution to the n-store
problem.
The impact of the stores on market prices and consumer surplus is determined in a manner
entirely analogous to that of Section 3.2.
4.2 The competitive solution
When stores compete there needs to be a mechanism whereby a clearing price in the
market is determined. Here there are in principle various possibilities according to the
rules under which the market is to operate. We discuss some of these in Section 4.2.1,
making a formal link with the various classical modes of competition in simple “single
shot in time” markets for balancing supply and demand in situations where storage does
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not operate. In the succeeding sections we look in particular at what happens when stores
bid quantities, i.e. at Cournot models of competition.
4.2.1 Possible models of competition
Consider first the case T = 2, and assume for simplicity that the stores are perfectly
efficient. Suppose that each store k buys and then sells qk (positive or negative), and that
this results in a price differential of p (the clearing price at time 2 less that at time 1) so
that each store k makes a profit pqk. We might consider the situation where, in a precise
analogue of the supply function bidding of Klemperer and Meyer [16], each store k declares,
for each possible value of p, a value Sk(p) which it contracts to buy at time 1 and then sell
at time 2 if the clearing prices at those times are set such that the price differential is p.
If each “supply function” Sk is a nondecreasing function of p, the auctioneer then chooses
the clearing prices p1 and p2 such that
R1(p1) =
∑
k
Sk(p) (13)
R2(p2) = −
∑
k
Sk(p) (14)
p2 − p1 = p, (15)
where, for t = 1, 2, Rt is the residual supply function defined in Section 2.
Assume that the residual supply functions Rt are strictly increasing. The system of equa-
tions (13)–(15) is easily seen to have a unique solution (provided the supply functions Sk
are such that one exists at all): suppose that, as p varies, p1 and p2 are chosen as functions
of p such that p2− p1 = p and R2(p2) = −R1(p1); then, as p increases,
∑
k Sk(p) increases
while R1(p1) decreases, and at the unique value of p such that we have equality between
these two quantities the above system of equations (13)–(15) is satisfied.
Mathematically, this situation is no different from that of the classical “one-shot” supply
function bidding of Klemperer and Meyer [16]. This was further studied in applications to
energy markets by Green and Newbery [12] and by Bolle [4], and subsequently by many
others—see in particular Anderson and Philpott [3], and the very comprehensive review
by Holmberg and Newbery [13]. In such supply function bidding suppliers (for example,
electricity generators) submit nondecreasing supply functions to a market in which there
is also a nonincreasing demand function, the market clearing price being that at which the
total supply equals the total demand. The behaviour of such supply function bidding is
considered in [16], in particular the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria. In practice
one might well wish to restrict the allowable sets of supply functions which suppliers are
permitted to bid (see Johari and Tsitsiklis [15]) so as to achieve economically acceptable
solutions. Two extreme cases are the classical situations where either suppliers may bid
prices at which they are prepared to supply any amount of the commodity to be traded—
corresponding to “vertical” supply functions and leading to a Bertrand equilibrium, or
else suppliers may bid quantities which they are prepared to supply at whatever price
clears the market—corresponding to horizontal supply functions and leading to a Cournot
equilibrium. In the former case, at the Nash equilibrium, the one supplier who is able to
offer the lowest price corners the market (and, in the case of symmetric suppliers, makes
zero profit). In the latter case, modest profits are to be made, but the total profit of all
the suppliers decreases rapidly as their number increases—as is seen also in our results for
storage models below.
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It is difficult to find a sensible and realistic way of extending the concept of general
supply function bidding to competition amongst stores operating over more than two time
periods—the dimensionality of the space in which the supply functions would then live is
too high, and the set of possibilities for market clearing mechanisms is too complex. Nor
is it realistic to consider the situation where stores bids prices, since as indicated above,
profits are then typically too small for stores to be able to recover their set-up costs. We
therefore restrict our attention to the case where stores bid quantities—as seems to be the
case where elsewhere in the literature market competition between stores is considered
(see, for example, Sioshansi [19]). Here the Nash equilibria are Cournot equilibria and
the profits made by the stores at such equilibria may be expected to provide reasonable
upper bounds on such profits as might be made in practice—for a review in the context
of “one-shot in time” markets again see Holmberg and Newbery [13].
4.2.2 General convex cost functions
We consider stores bidding quantities as above and look for Nash (Cournot) equilibria.
A (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium is then a set of vectors (S1, . . . , Sn) such that the
strategy Sj of each store j (i.e. the vector of quantities traded over time by that store) is
optimal given the strategies Si, i 6= j, of the remaining stores; thus the vector Sj solves
the optimisation problem Pj (defined by the remaining vectors Si, i 6= j) of Section 2.
Equivalently, at a Nash equilibrium, the vector Sj minimises the function (12) subject to
the constraints (5) and (6) and with the values of the vectors Si, i 6= j, held constant.
Broadly what happens at such an equilibrium is that stores will buy and sell more than
at the cooperative solution, since each store gains for itself the benefits of so doing, while
the corresponding costs are shared out among all stores. In particular consider n identical
competing stores with nonbinding capacity and rate constraints, but with common given
starting and finishing levels; for the moment assume further that they have round-trip
efficiencies  = 1, and that the price functions pt are differentiable. For each store k and
for each time t, write xkt = xt(Sk). At the symmetric Nash equilibrium, and for each
store j, there are equalised over time t the partial derivatives with respect to xjt of the
functions xjtpt
(∑n
k=1 xkt
)
. (For n = 1 these are just the derivatives of the cost functions
seen by the store.) It is straightforward to show that the convexity of these functions
ensures that in general unit prices received by the store at those times when it is selling
are higher than unit prices paid by the store at those times when it is buying, and so the
store is able to make a strictly positive profit. However, as n becomes large the above
partial derivatives tend to the price functions pt
(∑n
k=1 xkt
)
so that, in the limit as n→∞,
prices become equalised over time and the stores no longer make any profit. As earlier, the
intuitive explanation is that in the limit the stores become price takers and any individual
store is able to exploit any inequality over time in market clearing prices so as to increase
its profit. Thus at the Nash equilibrium market clearing prices are equalised over time and
stores are unable to make any profit. It is easy to see that essentially the same result holds
when round-trip efficiencies are less than one. In the case of linearised price functions we
quantify this result further in Theorem 5.
More generally the impact on prices of competition between stores, in comparison to the
cooperative solution, is to further reduce the price variation between the different times
over which the stores operate. Arguing as in Section 3.2, one would typically expect such
increased competition to lead to a further increase in consumer surplus. However, again
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this need not always be the case.
Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria. The following result shows the exis-
tence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1. Under the given assumptions on the price functions pt, there exists at least
one Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The assumptions on the price functions pt guarantee convexity of the cost functions
defined by (4). We assume first that the price functions are such that these cost functions
are strictly convex. Write S = (S1, ..., Sn) where each Sj is the strategy over time of
store j. Let S be the set of all possible S; note that S is convex and compact. Define a
function f : S → S by f(S) = (f1(S), . . . , fn(S)) where each fj(S) minimises the function
Gj( · ; S1, . . . , Sj−1, Sj+1, . . . , Sn) given by (4) subject to the constraints (5) and (6), i.e.
fj(S) is the best response of store j to (S1, . . . , Sj−1, Sj+1, . . . , Sn). It follows from the
strict convexity assumption that each fj(S) is uniquely defined.
Now suppose that a sequence (S(n)) in S is such that S(n) → S as n → ∞. Then, for
each j, the functions Gj( · ; S(n)1 , . . . , S(n)j−1, S(n)j+1, . . . , S(n)n ) (of Sj) converge uniformly to
the continuous and strictly convex function Gj( · ; S1, . . . , Sj−1, Sj+1, . . . , Sn), so that also
fj(S
(n)) → fj(S). Hence the function f is itself continuous. Thus by the Brouwer fixed
point theorem there exists S = f(S), which by definition is a (Cournot) Nash equilibrium.
In the case where the price functions pt are such that the cost functions given by (4) are
convex but not strictly so, we may consider a sequence of modifications to the former,
tending to zero and such that we do have strict convexity of the corresponding cost func-
tions. Compactness ensures that the corresponding Nash equilibria converge, at least in
a subsequence, to a limit which straightforward continuity arguments show to be a Nash
equilibrium for the problem defined by the unmodified price functions.
In general the uniqueness of any Nash equilibrium is unclear. However, we show in Sec-
tion 4.2.3 that, under a linear approximation to the price functions, the Nash equilibrium
is unique.
The proof of Theorem 1 also suggests an iterative algorithm to identify possible Nash
equilibria—analogous to the algorithm suggested in Section 4.1. Given any S the determi-
nation of each fj(S) introduced in the above proof requires only the solution of single-store
optimisation problem, which may be achieved as described in, for example, [5]). Hence,
starting with any S(0), we may construct a sequence {S(n)}n≥0 such that S(n) = f(S(n−1)).
Then, as in the above proof, any limit S of the sequence {S(n)} satisfies S = f(S) and
hence constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Different starting points S(0) may be tried, but, in
the case of nonuniqueness, there is of course no guarantee that all Nash equilibria will be
found.
Even under our given assumptions on the price functions pt the general characterisation
of Nash equilibria seems difficult. The following theorem gives a monotonicity result.
Theorem 2. Consider n competing stores with identical rate constraints and efficiencies
and whose starting levels and finishing levels are ordered by their capacity constraints.
Then, at any Nash equilibrium S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S∗n), the levels of the stores are at all times
ordered by their capacity constraints.
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Proof. Let (µ∗1, . . . , µ∗n) be the set of vectors (Lagrange multipliers) associated with the
Nash equilibrium S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S∗n) as defined by Proposition 1. It follows from (ii) of
that proposition that, for any t, and any i, j,
µ∗it ≥ µ∗jt ⇐⇒ xt(S∗i ) ≥ xt(S∗j ). (16)
Suppose now that the assertion of the theorem is false. Then there exist i, j with Ei < Ej
and some t0 such that
xt0(S
∗
i ) > xt0(S
∗
j ), S
∗
it0 > S
∗
jt0 . (17)
It now follows by induction that, for all t′ ≥ t0,
xt′(S
∗
i ) ≥ xt′(S∗j ), S∗it′ > S∗jt′ , µ∗it′ ≥ µ∗jt′ . (18)
That (18) is true for t′ = t0 follows from (16) and (17). Suppose now that (18) is true for
some particular t′ ≥ t0. It then follows from Proposition 1 that the condition S∗it′ > S∗jt′
implies µ∗i,t′+1 ≥ µ∗j,t′+1; hence, by (16), xt′+1(S∗i ) ≥ xt′+1(S∗j ) and so finally S∗i,t′+1 >
S∗j,t′+1. However, this contradicts the assumption S
∗
iT ≤ S∗jT .
4.2.3 Quadratic cost functions (i.e. linearised price functions)
We can make considerably more progress in the case of the linear approximation to the
price functions given by equation (1), where we again assume that, for each t, we have
p¯t = pt(0) > 0, p
′
t = p
′
t(0) ≥ 0, and that the function pt remains positive over the range
of possible values of its argument (so that our standing assumptions on the functions pt
are satisfied). This linearisation (1) is a reasonable approximation when storage facilities
are sufficiently large as to have an impact on market prices, but are not so very large
as to require a more sophisticated price function. The main reason for greater analytical
tractability in this case is that for a set of vectors (S1, . . . , Sn) to a be Nash equilibrium
is then equivalent to the requirement that they minimise a given convex function. In
particular we have the following result.
Theorem 3. Given the price functions (1), there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. It follows from (1) and (4) that the requirement that a set of vectors (S1, . . . , Sn)
be a Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the requirement that, for each store j, given the
policies Si, i 6= j, being operated by the remaining stores, the vector Sj minimises the
total cost
T∑
t=1
h(xt(Sj))
(
p¯t + p
′
t
n∑
i=1
h(xt(Si))
)
, (19)
subject to the capacity and rate constraints on store j given by (5) and (6). Now note that
this is further equivalent to the requirement that the set of vectors (S1, . . . , Sn) minimises
the strictly convex function
T∑
t=1
[
p¯t
n∑
i=1
hi(xt(Si)) +
1
2
p′t
(
n∑
i=1
hi(xt(Si))
2 +
( n∑
i=1
hi(xt(Si))
)2)]
(20)
subject to the constraints (5) and (6) being satisfied for all j. Further since this minimum
is also to be taken over a compact set, its existence and uniqueness—and hence that of
the Nash equilibrium—follows.
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Theorem 4 below, which is a scaling result, reduces the optimisation problem (the deter-
mination of the Nash equilibrium) for n identical competing stores to that of the corre-
sponding problem for an appropriately redimensioned single store.
Theorem 4. Given the price functions (1) and a common efficiency , for each n ≥ 1,
consider n identical competing stores with common capacity E(n), common rate input and
output constraints P
(n)
I and P
(n)
O , and common starting and finishing levels S
(n)
0 and S
(n)
T
respectively, where we have
E(n) = 2E(1)/(n+ 1),
P
(n)
I = 2P
(1)
I /(n+ 1), P
(n)
O = 2P
(1)
O /(n+ 1),
S
(n)
0 = 2S
(1)
0 /(n+ 1), S
(n)
T = 2S
(1)
T /(n+ 1).
For each n, let S(n) = (S
(n)
1 , . . . , S
(n)
T ) be the common policy over time of each of the
stores at the unique and necessarily symmetric competitive Nash equilibrium. Then, at
this equilibrium and at each time t, the quantity traded by each store in the n-store prob-
lem is 2/(n + 1) times the quantity traded in the single store problem, i.e. h(xt(S
(n))) =
2h(xt(S
(1)))/(n+ 1).
Proof. It follows from Theorem 3 that, for each n, S(n) minimises the strictly convex
function
n
T∑
t=1
(
p¯th(xt(S
(n))) +
1
2
(n+ 1)p′th(xt(S
(n)))2
)
(21)
subject to the capacity constraints
S
(n)
0 = S
∗
0/(n+ 1), S
(n)
T = S
∗
T /(n+ 1), 0 ≤ S(n)t ≤ E/(n+ 1), 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
and the rate constraints
−PI/(n+ 1) ≤ xt(S(n)) ≤ PO/(n+ 1), 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
The substitution zt = 2(n+ 1)xt(S
(n)), for t = 1, . . . , T , yields a single store minimisation
problem which is independent of n (apart from a factor 2n/(n+ 1) in the objective (21))
so that, for each t, xt(S
(n)) (and so also h(xt(S
(n)))) is proportional to 1/(n+ 1), so that
the required result is now immediate.
Remark 3. The reduction in Theorem 4 (for linear price functions) of the problem for
n identical stores to a single store problem, allows also the application of the various
sensitivity results of Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Theorem 5 below shows that n unconstrained stores (with identical efficiencies) in com-
petition make very much less profit in total than a single unconstrained store operating
in the same market.
Theorem 5. Given the price functions (1) and a common efficiency , consider n stores
subject to neither capacity nor rate constraints. Suppose further that the stores have a
common starting level S∗0 and the same common finishing level S∗T = S
∗
0 , and that this level
is sufficiently large that, at the (unique and necessarily symmetric) Nash equilibrium, the
stores never empty. Then, at this equilibrium, the quantity traded per store is proportional
to 1/(n+ 1) and the profit per store is proportional to 1/(n+ 1)2.
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Proof. The first assertion of the theorem may be deduced from the scaling result of The-
orem 4, and that theorem might be extended to enable also the second assertion of the
present theorem to be deduced. However, we use instead the argument below, which also
explicitly identifies the behaviour of the stores.
Write S¯ = (S¯0, . . . , S¯T ) (where S¯T = S¯0 = S
∗
0) for the common policy over time of each of
the stores at the Nash equilibrium. It now follows from Theorem 3 and the minimisation
of the function (20) subject to the constraint
S¯T = S¯0, (22)
that this equilibrium is given by
xt(S¯) =

λ− p¯t
(n+ 1)p′t
, p¯t < λ
0, λ ≤ p¯t ≤ λ

λ− p¯t
(n+ 1)2p′t
, p¯t ≥ λ

.
(23)
for some Lagrange multiplier λ such that (22) is satisfied. Note, in particular, that λ is
independent of n. Thus, as n varies, we have again that (x1(S¯), . . . , xT (S¯)) is proportional
to 1/(n+1) as required. It follows also from (23) (by checking separately each of the three
cases there) that, for all t,
h(xt(S¯))(p¯t + (n+ 1)p
′
th(xt(S¯))) = λxt(S¯). (24)
It follows from (19) and from (24) that, at the Nash equilibrium, each store j incurs a
total cost (the negative of its profit) equal to
T∑
t=1
h(xt(S¯))(p¯t + np
′
th(xt(S¯))) =
T∑
t=1
λxt(S¯)− p′th(xt(S¯))2
= −
T∑
t=1
p′th(xt(S¯))
2,
where the first equality above follows from (24) and the second from (22). Since, as n
varies, (h(x1(S¯)), . . . h(xT (S¯))) is proportional to 1/(n + 1), the required result for the
profit of each store follows.
Note that, under the conditions of the above theorem, the total quantity traded by the n
stores (at each instant in time) is 2n/(n+ 1) times that traded by a single store, while the
total profit made by the n stores is 4n/(n+ 1)2 times that made by a single store. Thus
we here quantify our earlier assertion of the Introduction that competing stores overtrade
(for the reasons already discussed there) in comparison to the cooperative solution; as
n→∞ their combined profit decreases towards zero. Clearly also, were the stores subject
to capacity or rate constraints, their ability to negatively impact on each other would be
less—as in the example below.
4.3 Example
We consider again the half-hourly Market Index Price data for Great Britain throughout
2014, as introduced in the example of Section 3.3. We again let the price function be as
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given by (11) and (without loss of generality as explained in Section 3.3) take the market
impact factor λ = 1. We consider n = 1, 2, 3 identical stores in competition, each with
a round-trip efficiency  = 0.75. For the single-store case n = 1, we take E = 10 and
common input and output rate constraint P = 1; for n = 2 we take E = 5 and P = 1/2
for each of the two stores, and for n = 3 we take E = 10/3 and P = 1/3 for each of the
three stores. Thus the total storage available in each case is the same. The values of E and
P are chosen so that the constraints on the stores are not so severe as to force essentially
identical combined behaviour of the stores for each of the three values of n considered;
nor are they so lax that the stores behave as if they were unconstrained as considered in
Theorem 5. For each n, we consider the unique Nash equilibrium in which each of the
n stores optimises its behaviour (minimises its cost) over the entire year subject to the
constraints of starting and finishing empty, and (for n > 1) given the behaviour of the
remaining store(s).
In the units of the example—for a discussion of which again see Section 3.3—the total
profits made throughout the year by the n stores are 4096 for n = 1, 3733 for n = 2 and
3267 for n = 3. For each of the latter two cases, if the stores were to cooperate instead
of competing, they would make the same total profit as in the single store case. Thus the
decrease in total profit is again due to the effects of competition. However, note that as
n increases through the above three values the total profit decreases at a rate which is
slower than that in the case of unconstrained stores, as given by Theorem 5.
Figure 3 shows the total level of the n = 1, 2, 3 stores and the corresponding market
clearing prices (again in the units of the example) over the first two weeks of the year.
The upper panel of the figure clearly shows that n = 2 and n = 3 competing stores
consistently overtrade in relation to the case n = 1 (corresponding to the cooperative
solution). The lower panel shows the extent to which competition between multiple stores
smooths market clearing prices, which is of course associated with the reduction in overall
profits. The times of maximum store activity correspond to the peaks and troughs of
the market clearing price and it is these peaks and troughs which are smoothed by the
competition. Note also that, because the round-trip efficiency  = 0.75 is significantly less
than 1, there are significant periods of during which the stores neither buy nor sell.
5 Variant problems
Heretofore we have considered the optimal control of stores where the objective of each
has in general been to maximise its own profit, obtained through price arbitrage over
time. Such behaviour has a variable effect on both producers (in the case of energy the
generators) and consumers. However, a store may alternatively be used to maximise the
benefit either to the consumers (i.e. to society, if the generators are excluded from the
latter), or to the generators, or to society as a whole. We consider briefly each of these
possibilities, so as to show that in each case essentially the same mathematical model
applies—and hence also both the form of its solution and insights into the effects of
competitive behaviour.
One or more stores owned by the consumers. Suppose that a single store is no-
tionally owned by the consumers (i.e. by society if the latter excludes the generators).
Here the problem is to use it so as to maximise the benefit to society. If at each time t an
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Figure 3: Total store level and market clearing price for each of n = 1, 2, 3 stores in
competition.
amount xt (positive or negative) is placed in the store, then this has a total consumer cost
(again positive or negative) which is the sum of the extra payment to the generator plus
the reduction in consumer surplus due to the market impact of the activity of the store
(the reduction in consumer surplus being zero in the case where the generator has a flat
supply function). The vector x = (x1, . . . , xT ) should then be chosen so as to minimise
this total cost, and that is just an instance of the mathematical problem considered in
Section 3 and for which Proposition 1 describes the form of the optimal solution. Note
that in the case where the generator’s prices are constant over both volume and time, the
store, even if perfectly efficient, is of zero value.
One or more stores owned by the generator. Now suppose that a store is owned by
a generator, and is used by the latter with the intention of maximising its own total profit.
Thus if, at each time t, an amount xt (positive or negative) is placed in the store, then
this has a cost to the generator which is simply that of producing it; further, if (at that
time) the generator’s production costs are nonlinear, the generator will re-optimise the
amount supplied to the market, thereby affecting its profit from that activity; hence we
may determine the total cost to the generator of the action xt. The vector x = (x1, . . . , xT )
may then be chosen so as to minimise this total cost (i.e. to maximise profit), and this is
again just an instance of the problem considered in Section 3. Again in the case where the
generator’s production costs are linear and constant over time, the store, even if perfectly
efficient, is of zero value.
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Both generators and stores owned by society. Finally suppose that both the gen-
erator(s) and any store are owned by the consumers, i.e. by society, and managed jointly
so as to maximise the benefit to society. In the absence of the store, the generator’s supply
function may be replaced by its (inverse) cost function i.e. that function which gives the
amount which may be (just) economically supplied as a (generally increasing) function of
unit price; the point of intersection of this function with the demand function gives the
optimal price, and the (optimised) benefit to society is the consumer surplus at that price.
The introduction of the store now modifies this theory in a manner entirely analogous to
that in the earlier case where just the store is owned by society.
6 Conclusions
In the present paper we have considered how storage, operating as a price maker within
a market environment, may be optimally operated over an extended or indefinite period
of time. The optimality criterion may be that of maximising the profit over time of the
storage itself, where this profit results from the ability of the storage to exploit differences
in market clearing prices at different times. Alternatively it may be that of minimising
over time the cost of generation, or of maximising consumer surplus or social welfare. In
all cases there is calculated for each successive step in time the cost function measuring
the total impact of whatever action (amount to buy or sell) is taken by the storage. The
succession of such cost functions provides the appropriate information to the storage as to
how to behave over time, forming the basis of the appropriate mathematical optimisation
problem. Further optimal decision making, even over a very long time period, usually
depends on a knowledge of costs over a relatively short running time horizon—in the
case of the storage of electrical energy typically of the order of a day or so. We have
also studied the various economic impacts—on market clearing prices, consumer surplus
and social welfare—of the activities of the storage. Where these impacts are considered
undesirable, the remedy is again the modification of the successive cost signals supplied
to the storage. We have given examples based on real Great Britain market data.
We have be particularly concerned to study competition between multiple stores, where the
objective of each store is to maximise its own income given the activities of the remainder.
We have shown that at the Nash equilibrium—with respect to Cournot competition—
multiple stores of sufficient size collectively erode their own abilities to make profits: es-
sentially each store attempts to increase its own profit over time by overcompeting at the
expense of the remainder. We have quantified this in the case of linear price functions,
and again given examples based on market data.
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